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Abstract: We examine mechanism design with transferable utility and budget balance,
using techniques we developed for the study of repeated games.  We show that with
independent types, budget balance does not limit the set of social choice functions that
can be implemented.  With correlated types and three or more players, budget balance is
again not a constraint if no player has "too many" more possible types than any other
player.   Moreover, in the latter case, for generic probability distributions over types all
social choice functions are implementable.
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1.  Introduction
We study the problem of mechanism design under incomplete information when
there is transferable utility.  Using techniques originally developed in our study of
repeated games, Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [1994] (FLM) , we develop sufficient
conditions for social choice functions to be Bayesian Nash implementable by mechanisms
whose transfers sum to zero, that is, by balanced-budget mechanisms.  We also consider
when implementing mechanisms can be constructed that satisfy both budget-balance and
interim individual-rationality constraints.
We have two sets of results.  The first set concerns the case where the players’
types are distributed independently.  Here we show that (i) any social choice function
(hereafter denoted scf) that can be implemented at all can be implemented with transfers
that sum to zero, so that the balanced-budget requirement does not restrict the set of
implementable scf’s (see Proposition 1).   Moreover, we show that (ii) if the scf being
implemented yields higher ex ante expected social welfare than autarky, then the
implementing balanced-budget mechanism can be constructed to be ex ante individually
rational (see Proposition 3).   Result (i) extends the theorem of d'Aspremont and Gérard-
Varet [1979], and result (ii) generalizes a conclusion of Laffont and Maskin [1979].
Both those papers,  unlike this one, consider only the first-best scf,  and restrict attention
to the "private values" case where each agent's utility function does not depend on the
types of the others.
1
Our second set of results concerns the case where the players' types may be
correlated.  Here we show that if there are three or more players, and no one player has
“too many” more possible types than any other, then for generic prior probability
distributions over types, (iii) any scf can be implemented with a balanced budget
                                                
1 d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet [1979] actually use a more general condition they call “condition C”
instead of assuming independent types. However,  verifying that the condition is satisfied requires solving a
linear programming problem, and he only case in which they show the condition holds is that of
indpependent types.3
(Proposition 4) and (iv) any scf that increases ex ante social welfare can be implemented
with a mechanism that is interim individually rational and has transfers whose expected
value is nonpositive (Proposition 5).  Result (iii) extends the theorems of Maskin [1986]
and d’Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-Varet [1990], which restrict attention to private
values and first-best allocations.  In contemporaneous work, d'Aspremont, Crémer, and
Gérard-Varet [1995] have obtained the same conclusion as our result (iii)  on the weaker
hypotheseses that there are at least three agents and each agent has at least two types.
Result (iv)  extends the results of Crémer and MacLean [1988] and McAfee, McMillan,
and Reny [1989], who considered the special case of allocating a single private good, that
is, an auction.
To prove our results, we use linear programming arguments to show that transfer
rules satisfying both incentive compatibility and balanced-budget constraints can be
found whenever it is possible to statistically distinguish between deviations by different
players. We originally used these techniques to study repeated games, where the analog of
utility transfers are the dynamic programming continuation payoffs.  In the repeated game
setting, balanced-budget conditions arise from the need to constrain continuation payoff
vectors to lie in a particular hyperplane or half-space.  Related techniques have been used
in Legros [1988], Legros and Matsushima [1989], and Radner and Williams [1989] in the
study of static moral hazard in teams.
2.  The Model
There are I agents, iI = 1, , K  with types qii ÎQ .  We assume each type space Qi
is finite, with ni  elements; we let QQ =´ ii , with representative element qq q = (, . . . , ) 1 I,
and set nn i i == Õ # Q .  Players have a common prior probability distribution p on Q.
An outcome is a pair  yx t = (,) , where x is an allocation of physical goods (or,
more generally, a public decision), and tt t I = ( ,..., ) 1  is a vector of income transfers from
the principal to each agent. We let X denote the (arbitrary) set of possible allocations, and4
let Ti =Â (the real line) be the set of feasible transfers to player i, so that TT ii
I º´ =Â.
(The assumption of unbounded transfers is quite important for our results about correlated
types; see the discussion at the end of section 5.)
Each agent iI = 1, , K  has a quasilinear utility function ux t ii (,) q+. This
formulation allows agent i’s utility to depend on the entire vector of types Q; in the
special case of private values, agent i’s utility is not influenced by the types of other
agents, so that  utility is ux t ii i (, ) q+.
After observing his  type, each agent sends a message or report mi  in the message
space  $ Qi to an unmodelled principal; a strategy for player i is thus a map mii i : $ QQ ® .
From the revelation principle, we restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms, in
which $ Qi is isomorphic to the type space Qi; henceforth we identify these two spaces and
write  $ QQ ii = .  Thus each agent i has kn ii
n i =  pure strategies. We will find it convenient
to number agent i’s types from 1 to ni, and index strategies by vectors, so that
mi*=mn ii [ , ,...., ] 12  is the “truthful”  strategy, and  the strategy mi[ ,...., ] 11  corresponds to
player i always reporting that he is the first type.
Let f be a map from Q to X; we  interpret this map as a social choice function
(scf).  Let FX =
Q  denote the space of all such maps.  A mechanism is a map
(,) : fX T tQ ® ´ . Each mechanism induces a Bayesian game among the agents in the
obvious way.  If truthful reporting is an equilibrium of this game, we say that the
mechanism enforces  truthful reporting, and also that it implements the social choice
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hold for each player i, type qi  and every possible report  $ qi , where p ii (| ) qq -  is the
probability of q-i conditional on qi.  We call this the enforceability constraint  for the5
mechanism.
2 The mechanism (,) ft has a balanced budget if  the sum of the transfers
equals zero for every possible vector of reports, that is  tq i i () = å 0 for all profiles q.
We will sometimes suppose that each player has the option of not participating in
the mechanism, and further that the payoff from not participating does not depend on the
realization of the types; in this case we normalize the non-participation value to 0.  We
distinguish two cases, depending on the point at which the players can opt not to
participate.  If the players can opt out after learning their types, the mechanism must be
interim individually rational:
(Interim IR) for all players  i and all qi
pu f ii i i i i i i i i
i
( ) [((, ) , (, ) ) (, ) ] qq qq qq tqq
q
-- - - +³
-
å 0 .
If the players must decide whether to participate before learning their type, the
mechanism must satisfy the weaker condition of being ex ante individually rational:
(Ex Ante IR) for all i
pp u f ii i i i i i i i i i
ii
() ( ) [((, ) , ( ) ) (, ) ] qq q q q q q t q q
qq åå -- - - +³
-
0 .
An scf  f is extremal if there are positive weights {} l i such that f satisfies
(Extremal)   fp u f fF i i i Î Î å å argmax ’ () ( ’ () ,) lqq q
q .
3
                                                
2This is the “interim” version of the constraint,  which corresponds to i’s decision problem after he learns
his own type. The “ex ante” version formulates the constraint on i’s choice of strategy before he learns his
type.  These two formulations are equivalent when all types have positive probability.
3This condition is sometimes called ex ante Pareto optimality in the mechanism design literature.  However,
because utility is transferable, (Extremal) is not interpretable as an efficiency condition when the utility6
We say that an scf is ex ante socially rational  if the sum of the player’s ex ante
utilities is higher under the mechanism than under “autarky:”
(Ex ante SR) pu f i i() (() ,) . qq q
q å å ³ 0
This condition is clearly necessary in order for f to be implemented with a balanced-
budget mechanism that is ex ante individually rational.  Finally, an scf is interim socially
rational if the social rationality constraint is imposed for all profiles of types:
(Interim SR) uf i i (( ) ,) . qq q ³ å 0f o r a l l
3.  Pairwise Identifiability
 We begin by studying the probability distributions over reports induced by
particular strategies. The key condition we use is called pairwise identifiability.  Loosely
speaking, a strategy profile is pairwise identifiable for players i and j if the probability
distributions over reports resulting from deviations by player i can be statistically
distinguished from those resulting from deviations by j; that is, if deviations by player i
lead to distributions over outcomes that cannot be replicated  by some (possibly random)
reporting strategy of player j.  Lemma 1 below shows that when this condition is satisfied,
any implementable scf can be implemented with a balanced budget.
To state the condition precisely,  choose a numbering scheme for each agent's pure
strategies and fix a strategy profile mm m I = ( ,..., ) 1  for the agents.  We let Pii m () - be the
kn i ´  matrix whose kth row is the probability distribution over reports $ q when agent i
uses his kth pure strategy and the other players  use m i - .  For any pair of players i and j,
                                                                                                                                                
weights are not equal.  See Ledyard and Palfrey [1994] for a discussion of the relationship between these
two conditions under a different normalization of the utility functions.7
we let Pij m ()  be the () kk n ij +´  matrix formed by stacking   Pii m () - on top of



















Definition:   The profile m is pairwise identifiable for players i and j if
rank (Pij m () ) = rank(Pii m () -) + rank(P jj m () -) -1, where the rank of the matrix is the
dimension of the space spanned by its rows.
Pairwise identifiability requires that the stacked matrix Pij m ()  have the largest
rank possible given the ranks of Pii m () - and P jj m () -: P ij m ()  cannot have rank equal to
the sum of the ranks of the two submatrices, since the row of Pii m () - corresponding to i
playing  mi   must be the same as the row of P jj m () - corresponding to j playing mj .
(Note, though, that pairwise identifiability does not require that the constituent matrices
themselves have full row rank. Indeed, submatrices cannot have full rank.  As the proof
of Lemma 3 demonstrates, the maximum possible  rank of Pii m () - is nn ii () -+ 11 ).
Lemma 1:  If the social choice function f is implementable by some mechanism, and the
truthful reporting profile is pairwise identifiable for all pairs of agents ij ,,  then f can be
implemented by a mechanism with a balanced budget.
Proof:   This is essentially lemma 5.5 of FLM.  That result shows that if a pure action
profile (here, truthful reporting) is enforceable, and is pairwise identifiable for every pair
of players, then it can be enforced with continuation payoffs (here, transfer payments)  on
any regular hyperplane.  Enforceability in the current context is equivalent to the social
choice function being implementable by some mechanism.  Regular hyperplanes are8
defined by weights li ¹ 0, and the transfer payments lie on the regular hyperplane l  if
lii i t å = 0 ; a balanced budget corresponds to the particular regular hyperplane where all
weights are equal.
q
Here is a sketch of the argument behind Lemma 1.   The first step is to note that a
sufficient condition for f  to be implementable with a balanced budget is that, for every
pair of players i,j ,  and every pair of nonzero weights bb ij , , there be  transfer functions
tt ij ,    that  enforce truthful reporting for  i  and j  (that is, satisfy IC for these players)  
and also satisfy bt q bt q ii j j () () += 0.
4   Setting all of the weights bi to equal 1, and
considering  the pairs (1,2), (3,4) and so on, shows that this condition implies that f  can
be implemenated with budget balance for any even number of players.  If there are an odd
number of players, then define transfers for players (4,5), (6,7) and so on as above, with
budget balance within each pair.  To define the transfers for players 1,2, and 3, let
{,’ } tt 12  be transfers that enforce f  for 1 and 2 and satisfy bq bq 12
1
2
0 () () += , let
{,}
" tt 23  be transfers that enforce f  for 2 and 3 and satisfy 
1
2
0 23 bq bq () () += , and set






" =+ .  Since t2  is a convex combination of transfer fuctions that
enforces truthful reporting   for player 2, t2  does also, and the transfers tt t 12 , ,..., I
satisfy budget balance, which finishes the verification of the first claim.
Next, note that the (IC)  constraint for player k can equivalently be expressed as
the inequalities
(*)  pu f kk () [ ( () ,) () ] qq q t q
q
+ å ³+ -- å pu f m m k k kk k k kk () [ ( ( ( ) , ) ,) ( ( ) , ) ] qq q q t q q
q
                                                
4 FLM [1994] call this “enforceability with respect to pairwsie hyperplanes.” The argument in this
paragraph is essentially lemma 5.3 of that paper.9
for all reporting strategies mk
Consider the set of inequalities consisting of the incentive constraints for players
i and j (as given by (*) when ki j = , ).  In light of the argument above, it will be sufficient
to show that these constraints can be satisfied when we replace each t j  in this set by
-bti for any nonzero b.
To investigate this question we turn to the matrices Pii m ()
*
- and P jj m ()
*
-.
Because Pii m ()
*
- does not have full rank, it has a row corresponding to some reporting
strategy  ¢ mi  that can be written as a linear combination of the other rows.  Because f is
implementable, there exists a transfer rule ti that satisfies the incentive constraints (*) for
the strategies corresponding to these other rows.  Moreover, implementability implies that
¢ mi  can be chosen so that ti also satisfies (*) for this strategy as well.  Thus, in seeking a
solution to the system of incentive constraints, we can delete the constraint corresponding
to  ¢ mi .  A similar argument applies to P jj m ()
*
-.  Proceeding iteratively, we can delete
enough rows from PP ii j j mm () ()
**
--  and   that the reduced matrices have full rank.
Pairwise identifiability then implies that the system of incentive constraints for i and j
corresponding to the reduced versions of PP ii j j mm () ()
**
--  and   is solvable.  But the way
that we have deleted  rows ensures that a solution to this system satisfies all  the incentive
constraints for players i and j.
4.  Independent Types
Suppose now that the prior distribution p on the agents’ types is a product
measure, pp ii i () ( ) qq = Õ , where  pii () q is the marginal probability of qi , so that the
types of the various agents are independently distributed.
Lemma 2:  With independent types, every pure strategy profile is pairwise identifiable for
every pair of players.10
Proof:  The intuition for this result is that when types are independent, the joint
distribution over report vectors is simply the product of the marginal distributions of the
reports of the individual players, so that the report distributions arising from deviations by
player i cannot be replicated by deviations of player j.  More formally, with independent
types, the game has a product structure in the sense of FLM.  The concept of a product
structure applies to a much broader class of games than those considered here.  In a game
in which each player i chooses an action ai and the profile of actions aa a iI = ( ,..., )
results in a distribution over outcome profiles yy y I = ( ,..., ) 1 , product structure is
satisfied if () i the marginal distribution of yi given a depends only on ai, and () ii  the
joint distribution of y given a is the product of the marginal distributions.  In our setting,
an “action” is a  reporting strategy and a profile of “outcomes” is just a profile of reports.
Hence  () i is satisfied trivially (a player’s report depends only on his own reporting
strategy) and () ii  holds thanks to independence of types.  The result then follows from
Lemma 7.1 in FLM
q
The following is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 1 and 2.
Proposition 1:   If types are independently distributed, then any social choice rule that is
implementable by some mechanism can be implemented by a mechanism with a balanced
budget.
In light of Proposition 1, it is interesting to ask which social choice rules are
implementable. The next proposition shows that in the case of private values f is
implementable if it is extremal.  Moreover, the set of extremal mechanisms does not
depend on the particular distribution over types:11
Proposition 2:  (a) If social choice rule f is extremal under the measure p on Q, it is
extremal for all measures with the same support.  If, moreover, (b) agents have private
values, then any extremal f is implementable.
Proof:   (a)  If f is extremal, there are positive weights {} l i such that f is a solution of
max ( ) ( ’( ), ) ’ fF i i i pu f Î å å lqq q
q .  Reversing the order of sums, we find that for each
q ,   f () q must maximize lq q ii i uf (’ ( ) ,) å , that is, an extremal rule must maximize
social utility pointwise.
(b) Suppose f is extremal and that agents have private values.  For each player i,
set  tq l l qq ij i j j ji uf ( $ )( / ) ( ( $ ),$ ) =
¹ å , where the weights l j are from the proof of part
(a), and  $ q  is the observed vector of reports.  If all others report truthfully, player i’s
overall payoff from reporting $ q i   when his type is qi  is
uf uf uf ii i i j i j ji iij i j j iij j
I
(( $ , $), ) ( / ) ( ($ , $ ),$ )( /) ( ( $ ,) , ) qq q l l qq q l l qq q - ¹ -- = += åå 1
1
Consequently player i’s objective is the same as the social maximization problem for
which f  is extremal; hence player i’s payoff is maximized by reporting truthfully, so that
for each q  the outcome is that prescribed by f.
q
Remark 1:  The proof of part (b) shows that, with private values, any extremal mechanism
is implementable in dominant strategies.  When the utility weights {} l i on all players are
equal, the transfers constructed in the proof correspond to a Groves mechanism (Groves
[1973].)  Propositions 1 and 2 together imply that any extremal mechanism is
implementable by a mechanism with a balanced budget in the case of private values and12
independent types;  this result was first obtained by d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet
[1979].
5
Remark 2:  Depending on the utility functions, many non-extremal social choice
functions may be implementable.  One classic example is that of monotonic scfs:
suppose that X  and each Qi  are subsets of the real line, that each ui  is concave and
twice-differentiable in x, and that ¶¶ ux i / is increasing in qi .  Then any scf that is
differentiable and nondecreasing in qi  for each i is implementable. (Laffont and Maskin
[1979]). Conversely, if ¶¶ ux i / is increasing in qi , but there are not private values, then
some extremal scf’s may not have the “expected monotonicity” condition (namely that
Ef
i ii qqq
- - (, )  be nondecreasing in qi) and consequently may not be implementable when
types are independent.
6   Section 5 gives a sufficient condition for any scf to be
implementable in the case of correlated types.
Next we turn to the question of implementation under individual rationality
constraints.
Proposition 3:   If types are independently distributed, and the social choice function  f  is
ex ante socially rational and implementable, it is implementable by a balanced-budget
mechanism that is ex ante individually rational.
                                                
5 As we noted in the introduction, their paper shows that the assumption of independence can be relaxed to
“condition C” on the solution to a linear program, but the paper does not indicate what conditions other than
independence might suffice for condition C.
6As an example, suppose that I = 2 and ui x ij x (,) ( ) qqq =- 2, where x  can be either 0 or 1 and each qi
takes values on the grid { , / ,..., / , }. --+ - 111 11 1 kk   The scf that chooses x to maximize the sum of the
two player’s utilities has x = 1 only if the sum of the two types is negative, and consequently is not
monotonic.  It is straightforward to check that this scf is consequently not implementable if types are
independently distributed and the “grid” of types is sufficiently fine, (i.e., k  is sufficiently big).13
Remark:  This proposition generalizes a similar result of Laffont and Maskin [1979], who
assumed private values.
Proof:  Under the hypotheses, Proposition 1 implies that there exists balanced transfer
rule t such that  (,) ft  implements f .   Because transfers are balanced and f is ex ante
socially rational,  we have
pu f ii i () [ ( () ,) () ] qq q t q
q +³ å å 0 .
That is, the sum over players of the "direct" expected utility plus the expected transfer is
positive. Thus we can find constants {} k i independent of q such that  ki i = å 0, and
pu f k ii i () [ ( () ,) () ] qq q t q
q ++ ³ å 0  for all i. Hence the transfers   ¢ =+ tq tq ii i k () ()
implement f, sum to 0, and are ex ante individually rational.
q
Remark:  The results of  Laffont and Maskin [1979] and Myerson and Satterthwaite
[1981] show that  Proposition 3 does not hold if  we replace ex ante individual rationality
with the stronger requirement of interim IR, even when the scf to be implemented is
interim socially rational.  Indeed, these results establish that even if the balanced budget
requirement is weakened so that only the condition that the expected sum of the transfers
be nonpositive is required, there is still a conflict with interim IR.  (However, Proposition
5 shows that this conflict vanishes in the case of correlated types.)
 5.  Correlated Types
Now we allow the prior distribution p to be any probability distribution on Q.
Here we can show that for generic distributions, truthful reporting is pairwise identifiable14
and every social choice function is implementable.  We prove the following result in the
Appendix:
Lemma 3:  Suppose that
(§) nn k kij i ¹ Õ ³
,  for all  i¹ j.   
Then for generic probability distributions on Q, the truthful reporting profile is pairwise
identifiable for every pair of players.
Remark:  An example may help to show both why the lemma requires more than two
players and why pairwise identifiability need not be satisfied by all strategy profiles.
Suppose that there are two players, each with two types.  Then, for any m2, the rows
corresponding to the three strategies mm m 11 1 11 22 12 [,] [,] , [,]  ,  and   are generically a basis
for the matrix P12 () m , (i.e., the matrix generically has rank three).  Similarly for P21 () m .
(This claim is verified in the proof in the Appendix.)   Then  pairwise identifiability
requires that P12() m  have rank 5.  But there are only 4 possible report profiles -- that is,
P12() m  has only 4 columns and so rank 5 is impossible.  Hence, there are deviations by
player 1 that cannot be distinguished from those by player 2.  However, if we introduce a
third player who reports truthfully, and whose types are correlated with those of player 1
differently from their correlation with those of player 2 (the generic case), then we may be
able to use the distribution over messages by player 3 to distinguish between player 1’s
and 2’s deviations.  Note, however, that if the third player does not tell the truth, but
instead reports type 1, say, regardless of his true type, then his report contains no
information about the strategies of other players.
7  Thus, even with three players, pairwise
identifiability for players 1 and 2 is not satisfied by all profiles.
                                                
7 More generally, whenever player 3 makes the same announcement for two different types, there is a loss of
information about the players 1 and 2.15
If each player has the same number of possible types, than condition (§) is
satisfied whenever there are three or more players.  More generally, the condition is
satisfied if the number of players is sufficiently large compared to the variation in the
number of types across players;  a sufficient condition along these lines is that the number
of players be at least 2+ln(max ) ln(min ) ii ii nn .
Once we have established that the truthful reporting strategies are pairwise
identifiable, we know that any implementable social choice function is implementable
with a balanced budget.  But, as the next lemma establishes, any social choice function is
generically implementable provided that a weak condition on the number of types holds.
Lemma 4:  Suppose that, for all i,  nn ji ji ³-
¹ Õ 1.  Then for generic probability
distributions on Q, any social choice function  f is implementable.
Remark:  Note that the generic set guaranteed by the lemma is independent of the  social
choice rule specified.  The proof shows that each fixed f is implementable for a generic
distribution; since there are only finitely many social choice functions, and a finite
intersection of open and dense sets is open and dense, the stated conclusion follows.
Note also that the hypothesis of lemma 4 is implied by hypothesis (§) of lemma 3.
Informal  proof:  To show that f is implementable by some mechanism, it suffices to
consider each player i separately and show that there are transfers that make it optimal for
i to report truthfully if he believes that his opponents will do so.  If player  i  is the only
player, the conclusion of the lemma is easily seen to be false: suppose, for example, that
player i  prefers allocation  x to allocation  y by an amount equal to qq ii , ,,  where  =123 ,
and that the social choice function calls for allocation  x if qi =1 and  y otherwise.  Then16
any transfer that makes type qi = 3 willing to report truthfully will induce all types to
make a report that leads to y being chosen.  Even if there are other players, we are no
better off if their types are independent, since in that case, their reports embody no useful
information about i’s type.
8
The principle behind lemma 4 is that correlation between types of the various
players allows the design of mechanisms that “detect and punish” misreporting by player
i.  More precisely, the joint distribution of others’ reports (assuming that they report
truthfully) is different depending on player i’s type.  Hence i  can be induced to report
truthfully by making his transfer depend appropriately on these other reports.  To
accomplish this, each type qq ii ’ ¹  must be deterred from reporting qi .  That is, each type
qi
’ must give rise to a different conditional distribution on others’ reports.  Since there are
ni -1 such types we need to deter, and P ji j n ¹  types of other players, we are led to the
hypothesis used in lemma 4.
Proof:   We must show that there is a transfer function t that satisfies (IC) for all  and i
all  $ . qq ii ¹   That is, we must satisfy nn ii () - 1  constraints.  Now these constraints can be
satisfied provided that the matrix Pii m ()
*
- has rank at least nn ii () - 1  (where m i -
*  is the
profile of truthful reporting strategies for players other than i ).  But, from the proof of
Lemma 3, Pii m ()
*
- generically has rank at least nn ii () - 1  provided that nn n ii ³- () 1 , that
is, P ji j i nn ¹ ³- 1 .
o
Combining lemmas 3 and 4 yields the following result.
Proposition 4:  Suppose that (§) holds. Then for generic probability distributions on Q,
any social choice function is implementabile by a balanced-budget mechanism.
                                                
8  In this sort of setting only monotonic social choice functions  can be implemented, see Remark 2,
following Proposition 2.17
Proposition 4 generalizes the conclusions of d’Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-
Varet [1990] and Maskin [1986], who assumed private values and extremal social choice
functions.  Maskin assumed each player had only 2 types; d'Aspremont, Crémer and
Gérard-Varet studied generic probability distributions, as we do. Using a technique based
on “scoring rules” instead of linear algebra, d’Aspremont, Crémer, and Gérard-Varet
[1995] obtain the same conclusion as Proposition 4, replacing our hypothesis (§) with the
weaker condition that there are at least three players, each of whom has at least two types.
Next we turn to the question of implementation under individual rationality
constraints.   Proposition 3 readily extends to the case of correlated types.  That is, under
the hypotheses of proposition 4, any ex ante SR social choice function can be
implemented for generic distributions on types by a balanced-budget mechanism that
satisfies ex ante individual rationality.  However, as in the case of independent types, one
can construct examples in which generically implementation with a balanced budget and
interim individual rationality is impossible, even if the scf satisfies interim SR; see the
example following Proposition 5.
Nevertheless, unlike the case of independent types, interim individual rationality
is attainable if the balanced-budget requirement is weakened to require only that the sum
of the transfers have a non-positive expected value.  This weaker condition is of interest
if, for example, the agents have access to a risk-neutral bank that can provide an infusion
of funds in some states of the world, but will agree to participate in the mechanism only if
its expected profit is non-negative.
Proposition 5:  Suppose that  P
ji nn ji ¹ ³  for all i.  Let f  be a social choice function that
satisfies ex ante social rationality.  Then for a generic probability distribution over q,  f is
implementable with a mechanism that is interim individually rational and such that the
expected value of the sum of the transfers is nonpositive.18
Remark:   The proof shows that f can be implemented with transfers such that every
player’s interim individual rationality constraint holds with exact equality for each of the
player’s possible types;  the assumption that the social choice rule is ex ante SR then
implies that the expected sum of the transfers is nonnegative.  Thus, if we think of the
negative of the transfers as accruing to an unmodelled “bank” or principal, this principal
extracts all the interim surplus that the social choice rule provides to the players.  When
the types of different players are independently distributed, mechanisms that enforce truth
telling may need to leave some surplus (“informational rents”) to those types with a
relatively high value from participating in the mechanism. This is why proposition 5 is
false for the case of independent types, as shown by the results of  Laffont and Maskin
[1979] and Myerson and Satterthwaite [1981].
Proof:   Fix a player i .  As the Remark indicates, it suffices to show that there exists a
transfer rule ti that satisfies (IC) and (interim IR) with equality for all values of qi.  For
each kn i = 1,..., , let rk be the n-dimensional vector of coefficients corresponding to the
interim IR constraint for the kth value of qi.  (Interim IR) can be expressed as
pk k pk u f k k ii i ii i i
i i
(, ) (, ) (, )((, ) , (, ) ) , qt q q q q
q q
-- - - - ³-
- -
å å
where we are slightly abusing notation by using “k” to denote the kth value of qi.  Hence
rk, the vector of coefficients of the transfers, is given by





where each “0” corresponds to a vector of  P
ji n j ¹  zeros).  Similarly, let rkl be the vector of
coefficients corresponding to the IC
pk k pk l ii i ii i
ii
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Hence, rkl can be expressed as








th entry th entry
.
To show that the set of these vectors is linearly independent, we must demonstrate that if
the equation






¹ = =å å å
1 1
0
holds, then all the scalars lk are lkl are zero.
Fix q-i and consider the component of (**) corresponding to the hth value of qi (i.e., the
coefficient of the transfer tq ii h (, ) - .  We have
ll q l q hl h i kh i
lh kh
ph pk + 
  
  +- =
¹¹ åå -- (, ) (, ) 16 0 .20
From the inequality in the statement of the Proposition, we know that the vectors
{ (,) , . . . , ( ,) } pp n i 1 ××  are generically, linearly independent.  Hence, since the above equation
holds for all q-i, we have
ll l hl h kh
lk
kh
¹ å+= -= ¹ 0 for  .
We conclude that all the scalars are indeed zero.
q
This result generalizes those of Crémer and McLean [1988] and McAfee and
Reny [1988] for the case of auctions with private values.
Discussion:   As with previous results about correlated types, propositions 4 and 5  cannot
be strengthened to impose a uniform bound on the absolute values of the transfers; the
transfers required can grow without bound along a sequence of correlated distributions
whose limit is a distribution with independent types. For this reason the results are of the
most interest in cases where the amount of correlation is not negligible.
To see that Proposition 5 cannot be strengthened to require an exactly balanced
budget, consider the following example.
Example: Suppose that there are two players (, ) i = 12 , each with two possible types,
qq ii
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Notice that f is not only ex ante but interim SR.  Moreover, the example satisfies the
hypotheses of Proposition 5.  Nevertheless, for an open set of priors  f cannot be
implemented by a balanced budget mechanism let alone one satisfying the interim IR
constraints.























where, for all i and j, pp ij r
ij = {,} qq 12 .   If the budget balances, we can express the
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Adding the inequalities in (*) together, we obtain 04 ³, a contradiction.  Clearly, the
same contradiction would hold if we perturbed the probabilities slightly.22
Appendix
.
Recall that the definition of pairwise identifiability for players i and j compares
the rank of a stacked matrix to those of its two constituent submatrices, and requires that
rank( ( )) rank( ( ) rank( ( )) PPP ij i i j j mm m =+ - -- 1.   That is, the subspace corresponding
to the intersection of the spans of the two matrices has dimension 1.   (The span of a
matrix is the linear space comprising all linear combinations of its rows.)
Lemma 3:  Suppose that for all i and j, i¹ j,
(§) nn k kij i ¹ Õ ³
,
Then for generic probability distributions on Q, the truthful reporting profile m
* is
pairwise identifiable for every pair of players.
Proof:    Fix the truthful reporting profile m*.  We must show that
 dim ( ( )) ( ( ))
** span span PP ii j j mm -- = I 1 .
Part 1:  Define the strategies mk mkk k ii () [,, ,] = K  (player i makes the same report  k
regardless of his type) and, for all hk , ¹ 1 , mh k m ii ( , ) [ ,..., ] = 11 ,...,1,k,1
h-1 components
12 43 4  (player i reports
type 1 unless he is type h ¹1, in which case he reports type k ¹ 1.)  Let Mi consist of all
strategies mk i ()  and mh k i (,) .  For each mi, let r() m i denote the corresponding row of
Pii m ()
*
- (that is, the distribution over vectors of reports generated by the profile
(, )
* mm ii - ).  Then




12 1 1 2 K =+ -
= å 38 .23
This shows that the span of r() M i  (=  r() m i mM ii Î U ) and Pii m (*) -  are the same.
9 In
particular, the rank of Pii m (*) -  can be at most the number of elements of Mi, which is
() nn ii -+ 1
2 .  (In the example following the statement of Lemma 3 in the text, each player
has two types, so that the rank of Pii m (*) -  can be at most 3.)
 Part 2:  We will find it convenient to work with the projection operator that sends
probability distributions on Q to the corresponding marginal distributions on the space of
type vectors q-i.  This map, denoted Hi, is given by the nn j ji ´






















If  p is a probability distribution on types, that is, an n-dimensional probability vector,
then  pH i () (, ) qq
q å ×  is the corresponding marginal distribution on types of  players other
than player  i . Denote this marginal distribution by p i -  .
Claim: For generic p, all i , and all  ji ¹ , rank ( * ) rank[ ( * ) ] PP ii ii j mm H -- = = #Mi.
To establish the claim, we will show that for generic p, the row vectors in
r() MH ij  are linearly independent.  This will imply that the rows of r() M i  are
independent as well; the claim then follows from the conclusion of part 1, that the spans
of Mi and Pi i m ()
*
-  are equal.
Suppose to the contrary that there is a linear dependence, so that for some vector
l ¹ 0, lr() MH ij = 0.  Let ph ji j -- - (, ) q  be the probability (under distribution p j - ) that
player i is of type h, and that the types of players other than i and j are given by q -- ij .
                                                
9This conclusion holds for any profile m i - , and not just for the truthful reporting profile.24
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where  rq () ( , ) mHk ij i j --  is the component of r() mH ij  corresponding to report profile
(, ) , k ij q -- .  Consequently, the component of lr() MH ij  corresponding to (, ) k ij q --  is




-- - = -- - = åå +=
12 0
where we are using the fact that the strategies mk i (, ) 1  are not in Mi.  This may be
rewritten as
ll l () ( , ) (() (,) ) (, ) kp k hk p h jj h
n i
-- = ×+ + ×= å 10
2 .
It follows that l = 0 provided that the vectors  pp n jj i -- ×× (, ) , , ( , ) 1 K =B  are inequalities.
Now the vectors  pp n jj i -- ×× (, ) , , ( , ) 1 K =B  form a nn ik ki j ´ ¹ Õ,  matrix, and, given
inequalities (§) , such a matrix generically has rank ni, that is, has independent rows as
required.
10  This does not  yet establish the claim, since it hypothesized generic
probabilities on the set Q, as opposed to generic marginal probabilities..
                                                
10 Note that the requirement that probabilities sum to 1 plays no role in the arguments that follow, as every
matrix is a scalar multiple of a matrix satisfying the adding up restriction, and scalar multiplication does not
effect the rank of a matrix.  The positivity requirement of probabilities similarly plays no role, as the set of25
However, we may view the probabilities p() q as a nn ik ki ´
¹ Õ  matrix, in which
rows correspond to types of player i , and columns to profiles of other player types. Let
Hij  be  the  nn kk kij ki ´
¹ ¹ Õ Õ ,  projection matrix that computes marginal probabilities
over types of players other than players i and  j. That is, Hij is the analog of Hi for maps
from Q-i to Q-- ij .  It is clear that that Hij is surjective (onto). Consequently, since it is a
linear map, it is an open map, and therefore preserves genericity.  The observation that
pp H jj j i j -- - =× () (, ) qq  then  completes the proof of the claim.
Part 3:  The claim of part 2 shows that for generic p,
dim[ ( * )] dim[ ( ( * ) )] span span PP ii ii j mm H -- = , so that  Hj  is 1 to 1 on the span of
Pii m (*) - . Consequently,  Hj  is 1-1 on span span PP ii j j mm () ()
**
-- Ç , and so
dim[ ( ) ( )] dim[ ( ( ) ( )) ]
* ** * span span span span PP P P ii j j ii j j j mm m m H - - -- Ç= Ç 38 .
Moreover,
[ ( * ) ( * ))]
(( * ) ) (( * ) )







ii j j j










Now dim ( * ) spanP jj j mH - = 1 .  This follows since player j’s strategy is irrelevant for
the distribution of outcomes of typesq - j : every strategy for player  j leads to the same
distribution over q - j  as m j -
*  itself.  Since d i m ( () () ),
** span span PP ii j j mm -- Ç³ 1   w e
conclude that dim( ( * ) ( * )) span span PP ii j j mm -- Ç= 1  .
o
                                                                                                                                                
matrices with non-negative entries is the union of an open set with its boundaries, and consequently inherits
properties that are generic in the space of all matrices.26
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